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CIVIL JUDGMENT RECOGNITION AND
THE INTEGRATION OF MULTIPLE-
STATE ASSOCIATIONS
BY R.C. CASAD. LAWRENCE: REGENTS PRESS OF KANSAS, 1981.
pp.258.
This comparison of the three systems shows that in every
respect except one, the Central American one does not go as far
as the others do toward providing a uniform region-wide system
of expeditious recognition and enforcement of the judgments of
sister states. Although the Bustamante Code regime, which
prevails generally in Central America, applies in theory to more
different kinds of orders than do the other two, this advantage is
more than offset by numerous drawbacks. The enforcement pro-
cedure in most of the countries is more complex and cumber-
some, the grounds for refusing recognition are more numerous,
and the conditions upon which recognition can be denied are
subject to more uncertainty and variation than is true in the
U.S. and the EEC systems. The international competency stan-
dards of the Bustamante Code are really not uniform, since the
code, in most ordinary cases, defers to local rules in cases where
they conflict with those of the code. And even in matters for
which the code does not defer to local rules, individual states
may reserve the right to apply their own law, thus preventing
the realization of a uniform region-wide system. The discredited
reciprocity requirement does have some force even in connection
with the judgments of sister states. The public-policy exception
is free to operate without any effective limitation. The rules re-
lating to recognition of judgments for the res judicata effects are
confusing and ambiguous. There is not even agreement among
the countries as to whether exequatur is required in connection
with mere recognition. There is no provision in the Bustamante
Code for the problem of inconsistent judgments.1
1. R. CASAD, CivnU JUDGMENT RECOGNITION AND THE INTEGRATION OF MULTIPLE-STATE
ASSOCIATIONS 166-67 (1981).
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These are not words that encourage harmonization of private
international law regarding the recognition and enforcement of
civil judgments in Central America. Casad's conclusion is also not
surprising after his meticulous presentation of how foreign judg-
ments are, or more accurately are not, recognized and enforced in
this region. The inability of the Central American nations to
achieve even a modest measure of unification of civil judgment rec-
ognition and enforcement is hardly surprising. It is, however, dis-
appointing to Casad, to this reviewer, and to other observers of
legal developments in these nations who have learned that more
than signatures on documents are necessary. Multi-state associa-
tional harmony in Central America has been transitory. Since the
twenty-one year old Federation of Central America dissolved in
1845, the most lasting of these associations has been the economic
integration effort of the Central American Common Market. It
achieved notable successes in its first dozen years of existence, but
succumbed to the internecine quibbling of Honduras and El Salva-
dor. Their ignominious "Soccer War" sparked a serious breach.
Casad sets the stage early in his book. He describes the history
of the associated status of these states, then deftly proves that the
current state is an attitude of a judicial sovereignty which permits
little trespassing even by nations with close historical association.
The title of the first chapter discloses Casad's positive perception
of Central America: "Central America: Integration and Reunifica-
tion." Briefly outlined are the attempts, and the occasional modest
achievements, at political unification after the end of Spanish rule.
But however intense has been what he refers to as the "impulse
toward reunification," he fairly documents that each success has
been followed by a disappointment.2 Effectively outlined is how le-
gal institutions within the area, including constitutions, have pro-
vided a more conducive forum for unification than any yet
achieved. However permissible these institutions may be, and to
whatever extent the periodic rhetoric suggests an impulse for
reunification, the facts nevertheless emphasize the disappoint-
ments and the relatively dim prospects for achieving consistency in
the recognition and enforcement of civil judgments within the area.
There has been frequent talk of a reunification in Central America.
Talk, however, has always been a primary commodity in Latin
America. Casad mentions the 1877 Treaty of Friendship, Peace,
and Commerce signed by five nations, stating that the countries
2. Id. at 3.
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were "disintegrated members of the same political body."3 When-
ever the protection of sovereign turf has been at issue, Central
American nations have shown little more interest in political, eco-
nomic or judicial harmony among themselves, than with any four
randomly selected nations from other corners of the globe.4
Casad, who has devoted many years of study to judicial insti-
tutions in Central America,5 systematically devastates any myth of
significant harmonization within the area of recognition and en-
forcement of civil judgments. This was not the original purpose of
his study. The reader is left with the impression that Casad wishes
sincerely that his chosen path had led him to a contrary conclu-
sion. Casad's sympathies affect his accuracy only infrequently. He
suggests surprise at the failure of the Central American Common
Market to have a judicial institution "in view of the relative suc-
cess enjoyed by the earlier Central American Court of Justice."'
That court, however, only functioned for its planned initial ten
year term.7 Casad's statement "that judicial institutions have by
and large, functioned well in Central America"8 is therefore a point
of some disagreement. This statement pertains more to the possi-
bility of the extension of the harmonization of judicial institutions
and establishment of a Central American court, than it does to in-
dividual domestic courts in each nation developing an awareness of
the benefits of harmonization. The latter is a judicial comity yet to
be recognized in any but isolated decisions.
The author permitted only a slight infusion of the region's last
3. Id. at 4.
4. Few observers believe that any political integration is a serious possibility. The eco-
nomic integration survived partially because of a political-economic homogeneity among the
nations. That no longer exists. Contemporary hostilities between and among the nations,
founded on often extreme differences in political and economic philosophies, are hardly con-
ducive to integration of even the most politically and economically benign transnational
interests.
5. See, e.g., R. CASAD & R. SOTELA, EXPROPRIATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND PANAMA.
PROCESS AND PROCEDURE (1975).
6. R. CASAD, supra, at 11.
7. It heard ten cases. Each of the five claims initiated by individuals was denied. The
court rendered two affirmative judgments, both against Nicaragua. Nicaragua refused in
both cases to comply with the decision. The United States, however, shares some of the
blame. See CASAD, supra note 1, at 8. The disappointing history of this ambitious attempt is
outlined by Manley Hudson in Hudson, The Central American Court of Justice, 26 Am. J.
INT'L L. 759 (1932). There were few positive effects of the court, but many institutional
obstacles to any probable success, obstacles which seemed as predictably retarding to its
success as those Casad discusses about the efforts to unify civil judgment recognition and
enforcement.
8. R. CASAD, supra note 1, at 11, 14.
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decade of economic and political conflicts to enter into his re-
search. Casad expected that the subject matter of his study could
be harmonized amidst even serious divergences in economic and
political structures.9 Infrequently, elements of the more recent ex-
treme political and economic dislocations that occur in the region
creep in by implication. An example noted by Casad is Nicaragua's
refusal to sign the Inter-American Convention of Extraterritorial
Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards. 10 Casad's
prefatory comments suggest, however, the possible futility of con-
sidering integration of Central America at this time. He further
noted that the history of Central America "has been marked by
tension and turmoil."
The express goal of Casad's study is to make some contribu-
tion to the process of integration, either when the current tensions
have diminished or when there is a renaissance of common inter-
ests (however transitory and inconclusive). While assessing Casad's
success must await a later date, his wish may well be fulfilled, be-
cause the book is a most effective identification of the inconsisten-
cies among the Central American states regarding the recognition
and enforcement of foreign civil judgments. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, it is a clear exposition of how inconsistent the area's devel-
opment has been through the years, particularly when the re-
stricted and varied acceptance of the Bustamante Code of 192812
and the Inter-American Convention of 1979 is considered. The lat-
ter was signed by all except Nicaragua, but has not yet been
adopted by any of these Central American nations.
A basic premise of the book is that for states linked together
in some form of association, whether it is a federation as exists in
the United States, an economic union exemplified by the European
Economic Community, or some less formal association, the recog-
9. To speak of the harmonization of legal institutions among these nations requires the
added qualification that not all of the inhabitants function actively within the dominant
legal institutions. Casad notes the racial composition in the various nations. See CASAD,
supra note 1, at 1. The harmonization of the treatment of judicial decisions which Casad
discusses even theoretically affects less than a third of the population in Guatemala, al-
though it affects a larger but uncertain percentage in the other nations. This legal pluralism
which exists within several of the nations does make for a complex national legal system,
but should not pose a significant obstacle to the harmonization of elements of the legal
system engaged in transnational activities.
10. R. CASAD, supra note 1, at 169.
11. R. CASAD, supra note 1, at XIII.
12. Bustamante Code of Private International Law, Havana, Cuba, February 20, 1928,
entered into force November 25, 1928.
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nition of the judicial decisions of member states is strengthened by
such association.13 The existence of the association adds associa-
tion interests to the judicial determination of recognition or denial
of a foreign judgment. The scope of any such "association of inter-
ests" currently existing in Central America in recognizing and en-
forcing individual nation's courts judgments is debatable. The na-
tional decisions later discussed by Casad might be expected to
disclose these associated interests. Unfortunately they do not.
Casad is unable to offer evidence that courts in Central American
nations have expressly shown a greater willingness to enforce judg-
ments from courts in other Central American nations, than to en-
force the decisions rendered outside the region. One may indeed
find numerous instances of the recognition, if not the enforcement,
of foreign judgments between nations of no greater association
than participation in the global community, than exhibited among
the Central American states. Recognition and enforcement may be
enhanced by close association, and may indeed be mandated by a
federal system such as in the United States. In the absence of an
enforceable association mandate, association interests usually will
not be sufficient. There first must be a commitment to the harmo-
nization of international interests that is stronger than procedural
and substantive judicial sovereignty.
Casad outlined a comparison of judgment recognition in the
United States and the European Economic Community. He sug-
gests that comity is not a sufficient justification for recognizing for-
eign judgments, because the interests of the recognizing state often
may not be very strong. An emphasis on comity also obscures real
interests which should be considered. Outlining five of the interests
identified by Trautman and Von Mehren, Casad suggests that al-
though an appropriate judgment recognition regime should reflect
a "rational balance" between national interests favoring and op-
posing recognition, most regimes are not based on such interest
weighing analysis.14 It is, however, important to note that even if
the weighing of local interests results in favoring non-recognition,
the state's interest may not be sufficiently strong in comparison to
the desirability of granting recognition and the promotion of a just
13. R. CASAD, supra note 1, at 21.
14. Professor von Mehren was writing at the same time as Professor Casad on judgment
recognition in the EEC and the United States. See von Mehren, Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Sister State Judgments: Reflections on General Theory and Current Practice in
the European Economic Community and the United States, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 1044 (1981).
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result. When some thought is given to a consideration of external
factors it tends to be either an expression of reciprocity (the judg-
ment will not be enforced unless the foreign country will enforce
judgments of the state asked to recognize the judgment), or a re-
view of the legal principles applied in the rendering court (granting
recognition or enforcement only if these principles are consistent
with principles of the recognizing jurisdiction). Casad considers
each of these elements on a country-by-country basis in his analy-
sis of judgment recognition within Central America, and discovers
disappointing inconsistencies in the various national experiences.
Casad next undertakes an interesting discussion of the signifi-
cance of judgment recognition to the integration of multiple-state
entities. New interests may arise, including those of the associa-
tion, which will invariably affect judgment recognition decisions in
the individual states, or possibly induce either a unification of
judgment recognition rules or even create a supranational judicial
authority. A supranational authority concept simply has not
worked in Central America. While it would not be inconceivable to
think of such a possibility where actual political and economic de-
velopment keeps pace with the rhetoric, it is more practical to con-
sider the increased potential for harmony accruing from a much
smaller measure of economic or political union.
The associational interests evidenced by the United States
Constitution illustrate how far judgment recognition can be carried
within an associated state area. The U.S. associational interests
also serve to emphasize how distant the Central American nations
are from principles of full faith and credit. The discussions regard-
ing recognition requirements (validity and finality), judgments
other than for money, grounds for nonrecognition, inconsistent
judgments, enforcement procedures, and recognition of conclusive
(res judicata) effects serve to illustrate how these elements of
judgment recognition are dealt with in the United States. While it
is not suggested that the United States achieves an optimum level
in each of these classifications, the United States does provide a
standard from which to evaluate other attempts at (or prospects
for) recognition even in the absence of the achievement of associ-
ated status. A question not considered is whether a federated sta-
tus is necessary for an optimum judgment recognition system.
State court decisions in the United States disclosing a state "na-
tionalism," moderated only by a reluctant acknowledgement of the
full faith and credit constitutional mandate do exist. Achieving a
[Vol. 17:1
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level of judgment recognition among disassociated states that
equals the level in the United States may, however, be impossible.
Whether the absence of successful associated status among the
Central American nations is attributable to anything more than
simply an aggregation of self interests that cannot grow beyond an
adolescent state is a crucial issue. Casad's book, by clearly illus-
trating the adolescent attitudes of these nations regarding judg-
ment recognition, informs the reader indirectly about the prospects
for meaningful future economic and political association in the
area, in addition to discussing the harmonization of judgment rec-
ognition systems.
The European Economic Community is used as the second ex-
ample of an associated state system, and because this system lacks
the political integration of the United States, the example focuses
on economic integration. The author discusses some characteristics
of judgment recognition under the convention, including the types
of effects (i.e., recognition and enforcement), the mechanics of
these effects, and the defenses to these effects (i.e., public policy,
lack of notice to the defendant, inconsistent judgments, choice of
law considerations, and jurisdictional defects). Casad also points
out the role the European Court of Justice plays in judgment rec-
ognition. His comments illustrate that as the associated state sta-
tus recedes from full political integration, there is an increase in
the reasons for member states to deny recognition and enforce-
ment. Within the European Economic Community, despite its ex-
tensive economic integration, a wide variety of circumstances may
create defenses. Even in the event of the re-establishment of the
Central American Common Market, which achieved far less eco-
nomic integration in its decade of existence than did the EEC dur-
ing a comparable term, the level of judgment recognition would not
be comparable to that in a federation of states, such as the United
States. While a comparison of Central America and the United
States may proffer a goal or standard for civil judgment recogni-
tion, a comparison with the European Economic Community al-
lows weighing the attainment of an economic integration that will
provide a preferable system of civil judgment recognition against
the achievement of a realistically possible system, because the in-
tergovernmental nexus is limited to a convention on civil judgment
recognition.
Casad questions the interests of the Central American nations
in recognizing foreign judgments by noting that no reference was
1985]
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made to this subject by the framers of either the General Treaty of
the Central American Common Market or the Charter of the Or-
ganization of American States. He states that "perhaps this omis-
sion is explainable as a product of a spirit of 'antijuridicism' that
seemed to dominate the formative meetings."1" This "antijuridi-
cal" spirit should have been explored, because unless it is clearly
transitory, it is crucial to the prospects of future developments.
Casad suggests that the main reason for the omission was that all
of the nations were parties to the Bustamante Code, which covered
judgment recognition. This is unlikely because all of the countries
in Central America (except Guatemala) had accepted the Busta-
mante Code with reservations. This can not be viewed as a success-
ful convention on private international law. In his outline of the
Bustamante Code in the subsequent chapter, Casad agrees. He
states that "it is not really an effective mechanism for a judgment-
recognition regime that (sic) aims at exerting optimum influence in
the promotion of the goal of integration among the states of Cen-
tral America."'16
Before Casad analyzes the Bustamante Code17 and discusses
judgment recognition on a country-by-country basis, he offers some
useful comments on the variety of meanings of several terms; on
how we conceive of those terms in the United States in contrast to
their general meaning in civil law jurisdictions; and, more particu-
larly, where there are variations in Latin American jurisprudence.
His discussion of the legal conceptions of such terms as jurisdic-
tion, competency, and res judicata illustrate the marked variance
from a U.S. viewer's perception. For example, Latin America cosa
juzgada, which is similar to res judicata, lacks a collateral estoppel
element. While referring to these differences is useful in illustrat-
ing that judgment recognition may vary in Central America, Casad
should have noted that the differences should not provide an ob-
stacle to a unification of civil judgment recognition.
The Bustamante Code was named after Antofiio Sanchez de
Bustamante y Sirven, a Cuban jurist, prolific scholar, and former
magistrate of the Permanent Court of International Justice." This
15. R. CASAD, supra note 1, at 43.
16. Id. at 66.
17. Bustamante Code of Private International Law, supra note 12.
18. See, e.g., Bustamante, LE CODE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PRtxr ET LA SIXIAME CON-
FERENCE PANAMERICAINE (1929); Bustamante, LA COMMISSION DES JURISCONSULTES DE RIO DE
JANEIRO ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1928); Bustamante, THE WORLD COURT (1925); Busta-
mante, AUTARQUIA PERSONAL (1914); Bustamante, EL ORDEN POBLICO (1893); Bustamante,
[Vol. 17:1
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Code was an attempt to create a system of private international
law that would be acceptable throughout the hemisphere. It was
intended to resolve some of the difficulties inherent in the 1889
Montevideo Treaty, which was the first successful Latin American
effort in unifying private international law.19 Although there was
limited participation by the United States and Mexico, the Busta-
mante Code essentially involved Central and South America. From
its inception, the Code was plagued by serious impediments. It al-
lowed participating nations to adopt either domicile or nationality
as the connecting link in choice of law issues. It also allowed na-
tions to adopt the Code with reservations. Some South American
nations did not even participate, most importantly Argentina and
Colombia. Many of the nations that did participate made extensive
use of the reservation power. Nevertheless, the Bustamante Code
was an important contribution to the unification of private inter-
national law. The disappointments that resulted are emphasized
by the fact that it was enacted when there was substantial hemi-
spheric interest in developing international law in general. This in-
terest seemed to transcend the retarding characteristics of nation-
alism. There was far greater political homogeneity among the
Latin American nations at that time than exists today. This trend
enhances the pessimism that permeates the most recent Latin
American collaborative endeavor, the Inter-American Convention
of Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral
Awards.
Casad explains the deficiencies of The Bustamante Code, par-
ticularly regarding its confusing classifications of internal public
order, international public order, and international private order,
which is an unexplained extension of ordre publique. The confu-
sion of these provisions, which appear in the civil law section of the
Code, was carried over to the recognition and execution of judg-
ment provisions. These permit an exception where there is a "con-
flict with public policy or the public laws of the country in which
its execution is sought."20 Public order exceptions exist in the Eu-
ropean Economic Community Convention as well as in most pri-
LECCIONES DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO (1893).
19. See Segovia, EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO Y EL CONGRESO SUD-AMERICANO
DE MONTEVIDEO (1889).
20. The Bustamante Code contains four books, International Civil Law, International
Commercial Law, International Criminal Law and International Law of Procedure. It is the
last book which is Casad's principal subject, although some of the definitional problems he
illustrates arise initially in an earlier book.
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vate international law conventions. It is the Bustamante Code ex-
emption that is most confusing, however, due to the lack of clarity
in the provisions and the confusion caused by Bustamante's
comments.
One of the curious aspects of the Bustamante Code is that it is
often extensive in scope. For example, it covers all civil judgments.
Even the EEC Convention's coverage is not this broad. Offsetting
this presumed willingness to recognize a wide range of judgments
are the provisions permitting reservations (the right to refuse rec-
ognition on a wide range of public policy exceptions), and the
broad range of competency standards permitted of signatory
states. The drafting of these sections was similar to the composing
of the original Latin American Free Trade Association documents.
After the intensive, but productive, discussions and drafting of
provisions providing for economic integration, and upon reviewing
what was to be integrated, the individual tides of nationalism
surged forward to overwhelm the growing harmony. One method of
determining how extensively nationalistic reservations have re-
stricted the drafting of international conventions is, not to look at
the provisions providing for unification or harmonization, but
rather to look near the end of the document at the exception pro-
visions. Analyzed by this method, it becomes clear that the Busta-
mante Code was from its inception handicapped in its role of be-
coming an effective mechanism for civil judgment recognition.
The final chapter of Casad's book discusses the work of the
Second Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law at Montevideo in 1979. This Conference led to several
private international law conventions, including the Inter-Ameri-
can Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments
and Arbitral Awards. 21 Although available for ratification since
1979, by early 1985 there have been only five ratifiers. None of the
Central American nations have ratified these agreements.
The Convention was designed to replace the Bustamante
Code. Therefore, it should be the new arbiter of foreign civil judg-
ment recognition in Latin America for several decades to come.
This system should provide more room for improvement than did
the Bustamante Code. Casad notes the precision of the new Con-
21. Chapters 2 and 10, which are the parts of the book which analyze the procedures
outlined in other chapters appeared earlier as Casad, Civil Judgment Recognition and the
Integration of Multi-State Associations: A Comparative Study, 4 HASTINGS INT'L & CON..
L. REV. 1 (1980).
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vention's provisions relating to the degree of finality that foreign
judgments must have to achieve recognition and enforcement. In
almost every other category Casad discusses, it is clear that the
Convention is not an improvement over the Code. For example, for
the different forms of judgments subject to recognition and en-
forcement, there are no provisions for recognition of contentious
administrative judgments, as exist in the Bustamante Code, al-
though the new Convention does have a broader application to ar-
bitral awards. The basic procedure for recognition and enforce-
ment remains essentially the same, but regrettably the Convention
retained the Bustamante Code's provision that allows state law to
govern the procedure. Thus, there remains the likelihood of requir-
ing a special exequatur procedure to be decided by the Supreme
Court prior to recognition or enforcement in a lower court. The
competency provisions in the Inter-American Convention are less
satisfactory than those in the Bustamante Code. There is no stan-
dard notice requirement included in the Convention referring to
the laws of the recognizing state. The Convention's recognition of
the res judicata effects of foreign judgments appears, in most as-
pects, to be no better than in the Bustamante Code. The provi-
sions on reciprocity, public order, and exceptions are similar to,
and preserve the inadequacies of, the Bustamante Code. The Code
addressed the issue of pending actions in the enforcing state which
was omitted in the new Convention. The addition of another con-
dition to be met before a judgment is entitled to recognition is a
significant new problem. The parties must have had an opportu-
nity to present their defense. The provision is unclear in meaning
and, as Casad points out, may offer "a potential for protracted liti-
gation over the interpretation of the requirement every time a for-
eign judgment is presented for recognition or enforcement."22
There is an unusual new provision that requires that any declara-
tion in forma pauperis recognized in the state rendering the judg-
ment must be recognized in the enforcing state. Casad's conclusion
that the new convention is not a significant improvement over the
prevailing regime is a tactful understatement.
The attempts of Latin American jurists to unify private inter-
national law has a long history of intensive and dedicated efforts
made by a series of outstanding Latin American jurists. Their work
has produced documents which have had serious shortcomings, but
which could have provided an underlying framework for the indi-
22. R. CASAD, supra note 1, at 180.
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vidual national judiciaries. While the Central American legislatures
were receptive to the idea of ratifying international agreements -
each ratified the Bustamante Code - all but Guatemala ratified it
only with notable reservations. These problems are exacerbated by
a judicial experience which has not contributed to the harmoniza-
tion process. Added to this must be the difficult access to decisions
and the relatively small number of decisions. This illustrates the
obstacles to the unification of private international law in Central
America, if not throughout all of Latin America. The new Conven-
tion has not resolved the problems raised by the Bustamante Code
and its life over the past half-century. Unification within the next
few decades will occur only because national judiciaries in certain
countries possess a vision of unification of private international
law. Such a vision would be expressed by the ratification and adop-
tion of the positive interpretive methodology of the new Conven-
tion. But even if the Convention is not ratified, that vision could
be expressed using the old rules.
Casad's final paragraph correctly suggests that adoption of the
1979 Convention "would not lead to a significant improvement
over the regime that presently prevails in Central America. 2 3 This
prediction becomes even more forceful when consideration is given
to the fact that most Central American nations are likely to ratify
the Convention only after making changes consistent with their in-
dividual conceptions of sovereignty, as they did with the Busta-
mante Code. Casad states that "[w]hat is needed (in the view of an
interested outsider) is a regime that would be tailored to the condi-
tions of Central America; and this regime should be reinforced by a
Central American Court.
24
If the Central American nations could determine what their
common conditions are, such a regime might be possible. It is far
more likely that there will be harmonization if these nations at-
tempt to break away from the larger and more dominant nations of
South America that also participated in both the Bustamante Code
and the Inter-American Convention, and seek a convention which
they can accept without reservations. This would effectively reduce
the obstacles carefully outlined by Casad and is within the realm
of possibility. Are there any significant grounds for believing in
Central American unity? Are Costa Rica and Paraguay any less




compatible than Costa Rica and Guatemala? Should Central
American nations forget regional unity and seek association in
larger groups? Recent years have seen a political diversity develop
in this area unlike any that have tested either that area or Casad's
associated nation comparison, the European Economic
Community.
The possibility of the fulfillment of Casad's suggestion of rein-
forcement by a Central American court is unlikely. The history of
judicial harmonization in Central America has been marked by the
inability to create a Central American Court of Economic Integra-
tion. The brief and disappointing history of the Central American
Court of Justice evidences the difficulties encountered by attempts
at unification. Our hopes should lie with attempts at judicial har-
monization by national courts. Knowing how to create institutions
does not necessarily mean knowing how to use the institutions
once created.
Casad's book explains the growth of private international law
within Central America and the obstacles confronting that growth.
The book leaves a sense of frustration. It illuminates the many
points of conflict. There are better alternatives than those imple-
mented by Central America thus far. Casad has made his contribu-
tion. The task is now before those nations which deserve and ex-
pect a better unification of law than they have been able to
achieve.
M. W. GORDON*
* Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.S., LL.B., University of Connecticut; M.A.,
Trinity College; Diplomede Droit Compare, Strasbourg; Maestro en Derecho, Iberoameri-
cana, Mexico.
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